Welcome to ASAC Dialogue — a complication of some of the work from our members, highlighting some of the work from in the business research community across Canada. Read what a few of our members have been up to below.
//
Bienvenue à ASAC Dialogue — une complication de certains des travaux de nos membres, mettant en lumière certains des travaux de la communauté de la recherche commerciale à travers le Canada. Lisez ce que quelques-uns de nos membres ont fait ci-dessous.
June 2023
An Essential Stupidity Based Review of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster
Jerry Paul Sheppard, Simon Fraser University
Jesse Young, Simon Fraser University
Read more
Today, there are still compelling reasons to revisit the event at Deepwater Horizon (hereafter DH). Knowledgeable executives in the multi-trillion dollar oil industry are still overtaken by seemingly predictable events. E.g., in early 2021, shareholder and legal moves made the oil industry confront the need to address environmental concerns. Why, more than 50 years after the first Earth Day, could they not see this coming? A stream of research has grown since the DH event that succinctly covers why such managerial oversights may occur. Specifically these are theories defining and surrounding ‘stupidity.’
Research objectives
In this paper, Sheppard & Young (2022) look to advance research on decision-making and risk mitigation by creating a more succinct view of how managers create, and might prevent, inept behaviours. To this end, the authors look at the evolving concept of ‘stupidity.’ They then seek to uncover what happened at the companies participating in the project on which the DH rig was working, and how their collective decisions and actions led to the sinking of the oilrig on Earth Day, 2010. To tie all this together they present proposals to address and avoid potentially unwise decisions that may lead to disaster.
The research method
The authors provide a review on the stupidity literature. This is followed by an in-depth case study of the DH event where the authors convey a comprehensive picture of oilrig conditions, and the decisions and actions taken by those who controlled it. These elements are then analyzed for their stupidity features. The case development was aided by the fact that the event has been intensely studied by government, industry experts, and academics. Finally, proposals for change are inductively developed.
The research review
Regarding stupidity, first of all, stupidity is where two parties involved in an interaction both suffer a loss (Cipolla, 2019). With a large organization this means that multiple stakeholders lose out.
Second, there are recognized ‘stupid’ actions. When viewing unwise actions, Aczel, et al. (2015) found subjects used ‘stupid’ to identify three scenarios. One is ‘confident ignorance’ (being certain about one’s abilities despite evidence to the contrary). Two is ‘absentminded failure of attention.’ (organization members ignore issues that do not appear to seriously impact selected goals). Three is a ‘lack of control’ or obsessive/compulsive behaviours (e.g., autocratic executives may imperil their organizations by not accepting objections from those charged with implementing the executive’s preconceived plans).
Third, functional stupidity includes an organizationally supported lack of reflection, and a refusal to use intellectual resources outside a narrow, safe space. As well, there is a lack of organizational members questioning claims to knowledge or norms. Finally, organizational members lack the desire to use or process knowledge, or bring valuable cognitive resources and intelligence to bear on a problem.
Fourth, reinforcement of inapt behaviours arises from both individual and organizational efforts. Individually, new data that may change evaluation of the facts gets ignored and a need for rapid response means actors prefer a “fast, intuitive, automatic, emotional, effortless and implicit mode of thinking” (Engler, et al., 2017, p. 8) rather than fully engaged analysis. Organizationally, decision makers are not open to suitable alternatives to current behaviours as they cannot process all available information; this leads to information restriction and a tendency toward reinforcing well-learned, but inapt, responses.
The applications to the DH case begin with the losses all stakeholders incurred. In the case of the DH this extended far beyond directly human and financial losses to a far-reaching group of stakeholders. For example, communities lost tourist dollars; fisheries were ruined; natural ecosystems were destroyed.
Recognizably stupid actions can be seen. DH personnel exhibited confident ignorance in taking high risks with shortcuts while lacking needed skills (the short tenure of lower-level managers were some evidence of this). There were failures of attention – e.g. there was no attempt to develop ways to reduce the problematic loss of millions of litres of drilling mud. Finally, there was an obsessive/compulsive focus on cost considerations over the adherence to industry standards that would have moderated risk.
Functional stupidity occurred via a structurally supported lack of reflection and a refusal to use intellectual resources outside a narrow, safe space. Profit goals may well have focused personnel on cost cutting that resulted in avoiding costly safeguards. There was a paradox that organizational members did not question norms when it came to the need to wrap-up the project while concurrently questioning the norms of established engineering protocols. Finally, decision makers did not bring cognitive resources to bear on their problems, e.g. their failure to take required measurements and run needed calculations.
The reinforcement of inapt behaviours meant that new data that may have changed evaluation of the facts got ignored. Procedures that should have been used were not done. Information processing biases skewed toward the bottom-line meant managers poorly applied evaluative criteria when faced with an array of alternatives and the special circumstances that presented themselves. At the organizational level, there was a tendency toward reinforcing well-learned responses skewed more toward risk-taking, an emphasis on cost-savings, and a poor understanding of how the risks being taken accumulated.
Three basic elements here reinforced flawed judgments to let stupidity slip into tragedy. One, mission myopia was present such that when cost cutting was stressed, goals like risk avoidance got dismissed. Two, redundant systems simultaneously failed as personnel on the DH ignored gas sensor alarms, engineering model recommendations, and construction design advice. Three, for multiple systems to fail, people who must communicate with each other failed to do so. In the DH case there were large communications failures between employees and contractors on the rig and multiple parties on land.
Implications for management practice
First, Communicate openly about doubts about decisions. This is a precursor to any other advice. Allowing employees to find, detect, and correct errors involves some reflection to identify discrepancies between actual and desired performance. It may also mean creating a culture where such knowledge is shared across the organization via an open and honest re-examination of basic assumptions and rules of operations. This may include checking internal processes to avoid potential problems like groupthink.
Second, learn to weigh risk by looking at potential losses. When, in years’ past, the firm in charge of the DH (British Petroleum) reduced their workforce and multiple hierarchical levels they gave lower level employees more authority. Without a concurrent grasp of risks or psychological biases, these newly empowered actors were less likely to be able to properly assess risk. When multiple decisions are made in concert it is vital to consider the need for risk analysis experts to evaluate critical, but risky, decisions.
Third, understand and track the accumulated effect of errors as multiple causes create disasters. To stop large numbers of small errors from creating problems, organizations need to “build information systems to capture and organize data, enabling detection of anomalies” (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005, p. 312). Yet, tracking errors may provide evidence in a later court case if all goes badly. But such tracking may be the best way to assess procedures. Again, evaluation by risk assessment experts may be needed.
Fourth, spot confident ignorance and promote real learning; if personnel know less than what is required there is a need for training. To allow for this, organizations must develop “policies such as blameless reporting systems and publicizing failures as a means of learning” (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005, p. 312). Such learning must have top management support and resources to implement change.
Fifth, allow for mission drift so that there can be consideration of broader goals when the need dictates. Conditions may change and require altering an organization’s mission over time. Stopping mission myopia when conditions dictate by creating corporate cultures that allow for discourse about concurrently weighing multiple goals is vital. Top management must support reflection in a way that allows employees to use, or process, what knowledge they have, and to seek information they need.
References
Aczel, B., Palfi, B., & Kekecs, Z. (2015). What is stupid? People’s conception of unintelligent behavior. Intelligence, 53, 51-58. doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2015.08.010
Cipolla, C. M. (2019). The basic laws of human stupidity. New York, NY: Penguin Random House.
Cannon, M. D., & Edmondson, A. (2005). Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelligently). Long Range Planning, 38(3), 299-319. doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2005.04.005
Engler, J. O., Abson, D. J. and von Wehrden, H. (2017, December 12). ‘It’s the Psychology, Stupid!’ Understanding Human Cognition Biases. SSRN http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3086532
Sheppard, J.P., & Young, J. (2022). An essential stupidity-based review of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Business Horizons, 66(7), 65-73. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2022.02.002
Benjamin Graham and the Evolution of Value Investing
Mohammad Siddiquee, Mount Saint Vincent University
Read more
Value investing is buying an asset for less than its intrinsic value; it is inseparable from Benjamin Graham. Through his writings—articles and two investment classics, Security Analysis (1934) and The Intelligent Investor (1949)—Graham almost single-handedly bring discipline to the uncharted financial wilderness of his time. In this article, I examine Graham’s works to understand the enduring principles of value investing. Four distinct time periods are discussed: (1) value investing before Graham, (2) the early era (1917–1934), (3) the founding era (1934–1976), and (4) the post-Graham era (1976–present). The paper concludes with a discussion of whether value investing is still relevant today. A complete list of Graham’s published work is provided. (N=115)
Research objectives
Value investing is an investment philosophy established by Benjamin Graham. The idea is simple: buy an asset for less than its intrinsic value or, in other words, with an ample margin of safety. To study value investing without reviewing the remarkable contributions of Benjamin Graham would be incomplete, if not unthinkable.
The strength and beauty of Graham’s contribution to investing are that even after so many years, his method still delivers stellar performance in a field of knowledge where usually, last year is considered obsolete. He has earned the admiration of many and the nickname ‘the Dean of Wall Street.’
In this article, I examined Graham’s works to understand the enduring principles of value investing. Because every discipline evolves, I studied Graham, his precursors and successors, and his profession across eight decades. I reviewed Graham’s work and its influence on the development of value investing. Some of his articles not mentioned in other sources are discussed to present a fuller picture of his theoretical work and its practical application. I do not wish to discount the contribution of other thinkers in this field, but I want to emphasize the impact of Graham in shaping the value investment approach.
Research method
I did a comprehensive literature review that involved collecting, reading, analyzing, and summarizing the scholarly contribution made by Benjamin Graham in advancing the field of value investing. This article is the result of the literature review.
Of course, scholarly work on Graham has been done by previous scholars. Some date the first articulation of investment principles to Graham’s evening course at the New York Institute of Finance in 1927. Other sources, however, pinpoint the origin to 1934, when Graham and David Dodd published Security Analysis.
In the literature review, I loosely follow Calandro’s (2014) categorization, such as the founding era (1934–1973), the post-Graham era (1973–1991), and the modern era (1991–present) but add a fourth, pre-Graham, era to capture the ideas and thinkers who influenced Graham at the beginning of his career.
Research findings
The literature review provides an overview of the evolution of value investing through a careful examination of Benjamin Graham’s published works. It also provides the sources of his scholarly contribution to the field of intelligent investing. Before this article, a complete list of his works was virtually non-existence. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first article that compiled a complete list of Graham’s published work. (N=115), which includes his two classics, Security Analysis (1934) and The Intelligent Investor (1949), and numerous articles he wrote for financial publications such as Financial Analysts Journal, Forbes, The Magazine of Wall Street, and Barron’s. These scholarly works are widely considered to be foundational materials in the field of value investing.
Implications for management practice
Graham’s ideas profoundly impacted the investment community, and many successful investors have followed his approach. Graham’s philosophy has influenced some renowned investors, including Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, Walter Schloss, Irving Kahn, and Seth Klarman.
Investors of all stripes can benefit from following in the footsteps of Graham and his disciples. His approach has stood the test of time in various market environments. Despite the occasional underperformance of value investing, this is the first investment paradigm sustained for a long time. When applied skillfully, value investing can deliver better risk-adjusted returns than the market. Why, then, do many investors still resist the value approach? Warren Buffett offered the following hypothesis:
“I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years I’ve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It’s likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.” (Buffett 1984, 14–15)
Despite being ignored in academic circles for many years, Graham’s investing paradigm remains strong. His ideas continue to influence investors worldwide after almost 90 years of the publication of Security Analysis.
APA Citation: Siddiquee, M. (in press). Benjamin Graham and the Evolution of Value Investing. History of Economic Ideas
Mohammad Siddiquee, Ph.D.
Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax NS
Can Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Lead to Social License (SL)?
Shuna Shu Ham Ho, Dalhousie University
Chang Hoon Oh, University Kansas
Daniel Shapiro, Simon Fraser University
Read more
Although it is widely argued that socially responsible corporations are viewed positively by stakeholder communities and that regularly practicing corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviour improves respectful relationships with the communities, there is limited systematic evidence in support of this. On the contrary, there are some counter examples that show otherwise. For instance, Chevron’s socially responsible initiative intended for developing the community within the Niger Delta turned into crisis in 2003, when violent protests and bloody clashes by the community not only destroyed the local infrastructure that Chevron had invested but also forced Chevron to suspend its local operations. In view of this, we explored in our recent article published by the Journal of Management Studies (Ho, Oh, & Shapiro, 2022) the boundary conditions circumscribing the relationship between CSR and the approval by local communities. Such approval is referred to as a “social license (SL) to operate”, which is a concept emerged from a World’s Bank roundtable for the global mining industry in 1997.
Research Method
As prior literature stated that institutionalized trust is fundamental to the approval of SL by communities, whereas SL disapproval is manifested in such conflicts as protests and blockages that express community anger, we operationalized SL as a continuum of the emotion of trust as opposed to anger through such big data and natural language processing technique as sentiment analysis. We collected articles from Dow Jones’ Factiva digital archive of global news, and in each article, we extracted the percentage of words associated with trust minus those associated with anger based on the National Research Council (NRC) Canada’s Sentiment and Emotion Lexicon in R computing environment. In total, we evaluated the percentages of 3,696 news articles, which represented the SLs of 43 multinational corporations that have mining operations within 523 local communities of 27 host countries between 2008 and 2020.
Research Findings
We found that the relationship between CSR and SL is positive. However, this relationship is negatively affected when a corporation’s social legitimacy is deemed weak by global society, or when the host country of the corporation is strong in rule of law, or when members of the community in which the corporation operates are polarized. Although these findings are applicable to many different corporations, especially those in the global mining industry, they can be elucidated by Chevron’s case in the Niger Delta.
Social Legitimacy in Global Society
As a corporation within the mining industry, of which the extractive nature is regarded as controversial, Chevron’s legitimacy has always been challenged at the global level. For several decades prior to Chevron’s crisis in the Niger Delta in 2003, it has already had conflicts with communities elsewhere, for instance, in Ecuador. What adds to the problem is that Chevron has not shown its adherence to universal norms by signing up for such global standards as the Global Reporting Initiative and the United Nations Global Compact. Given Chevron’s history, or lack thereof, it is hard for the Niger Delta community to trust Chevron or to believe that social justice can successfully be claimed from Chevron. In other words, Chevron’s CSR initiative can be judged by the local community as dubious, and hence, unacceptable.
Rule of Law in Host Country
According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, the level of rule of law in Nigeria, where the Niger Delta is located, is -1.43 in 2003, when Chevron’s crisis occurred. Compared to an average of 0.04 and a median of -0.04 across all countries in that year, Nigeria’s rule of law is weak. Rule of law, which protests freedom of speech, assembly, and association, not only supports local communities to mobilize through regulatory hearings and legal interventions but also empowers them to express their voice, or anger, by allowing them to obstruct the operations of a corporation. This implies that Chevron’s crisis could have been even more severe in another country with stronger rule of law. The more severe the crisis, the more likely SL is disapproved.
Polarization within Local Community
As a fixed and identifiable ethnic group dominating over Ijaw within the Niger Delta, Itsekiri has always been treated by Ijaw as a rival. Envious of Itsekiri’s prosperity, Ijaw tends to perceive that benefits have been distributed disproportionally to Itsekiri’s advantage over time. As such, despite Chevron’s effort to satisfy both ethnic groups through separate agreements, it encountered unrealistic demand escalated by competition between groups that made the agreements unmanageable. Ongoing tensions between Ijaw and Itsekiri eventually broke into anger manifested by bloody clashes in 2003. Owing to a lack of consensus, apparently, the Niger Delta community failed to reasonably approve the CSR activities run by Chevron.
Implications for Management Practice
There are four major takeaways from our research for managers aiming at winning SLs:
First, managers should keep track of the SLs of their corporations. They can do so by following the sentiment analysis of news articles demonstrated in our research. A community-specific SL can be operationalized as the degree of trust as opposed to anger.
Second, managers should engage in CSR activities at both the local and the global levels, because the global social legitimacy of a corporation is as important as the quality of local CSR initiatives in terms of attaining a SL. They should prove the trustworthiness of their corporations. One way of doing so is ensuring that CSR initiatives across all local communities are consistently up to the global standards established by international organizations and performance rating agencies.
Third, managers should shift their focus on CSR from the local level to the global level, when rule of law in a host country is relatively strong. This is partly because cooperative solutions between corporations and local communities can be reached through formal institutions in such country. This is also because the cost-effectiveness of local CSR in minimizing corporation-community conflicts is lower when compared to countries with weaker rule of law.
Fourth, managers should avoid locating operations within a community where the stakeholder group having dominant veto power over SL is rigid. This is because the rivalry between the dominant and the minority groups hinders them from reaching any agreement. They are thus unable to consent altogether what or how much is needed for them to approve a corporation’s SL.
Reference
Ho, S. S. H., Oh, C. H, & Shapiro, D. (2022). Can corporate social responsibility lead to social license? A sentiment and emotion analysis. Journal of Management Studies, 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12863
Corporate wrongdoing and board leadership structure: An analysis of the WestJet spying scandal
Shamsud D. Chowdhury, Dalhousie University
Jerry Paul Sheppard, Simon Fraser University
Read more
Canada’s second largest airline, WestJet (WJ, hereafter) engaged in serious corporate espionage in 2003. In March of that year WJ gained employee access to the reservations website of their larger rival, Air Canada. With this data access WJ was able to relocate planes, increase load factors, and improve aircraft utilization. Later that year, Air Canada was alerted to this breach, traced the source back to WJ and was able to obtain supporting evidence. Armed with proof and alleging that WJ boosted its profits using illegally obtained data, Air Canada launched a $220 million lawsuit against WJ in April 2004.
WJ’s chair and CEO, Clive Beddoe, eventually admitted in public that the conduct was both unethical and unacceptable. After legal wrangling for over two years, Beddoe took full responsibility for what happened and apologized to Air Canada and its CEO Robert Milton. WJ reimbursed Air Canada $5.5 million for costs and paid $10 million to children’s charities in Air Canada’s name. Beddoe remained board chair but, in an effort to ensure better oversight, handed the CEO position to Sean Durfy, executive VP for marketing and sales. Thus, WJ altered its board structure from duality to non-duality.
Research objectives
In this paper, Chowdhury and Sheppard (2022) seek to clarify if and how continual force exerted by the exposure of acts of organizational wrongdoing correlate with a change in board structure. Simply, how does corporate wrongdoing affect existing board structures to the point it will change to an alternate structure, i.e., CEO duality to non-duality or vice versa? This paper investigates WJ’s corporate espionage and its subsequent change in board structure. Corporate espionage refers to acts entailing the acquisition of “information considered confidential and important without the knowledge and permission of the party to whom the information belongs” (Vashisth & Kumar, 2013, p. 83). This variant of wrongdoing includes practices like collection of data on competitors through electronic surveillance, searching through garbage, or trespassing on private property, and is considered unethical by industry professionals.
Research method
To explore the research question a single, in-depth case on WJ was created. Case studies are useful where theoretical research perspectives conflict, as they do with the study of corporate wrongdoing. Case studies allow for a contextual understanding of conditions that lead to an event and can show the unfolding events through multiple stakeholder lenses, i.e. investors, directors and media.
A list of significant scandal events at WestJet were gathered from secondary, published sources from the scandal’s start (when the news became public in April 2004) to its end (when WestJet undertook changed from CEO duality to non-duality in September 2007). The Nexus/Lexus, ProQuest Canadian Newsstream, Factivia and Sedar databases were used to research these events for the 42-month study period. The search terms “WestJet” and “WestJet and espionage” were employed in the investigation.
To create a parsimonious set of critical events and reveal related market reactions, the researchers calculated when WJ stock exhibited abnormal returns. Using event study methodology on a rolling basis for the 880 trading days under study a two-factor market model to calculate cumulative abnormal returns for WJ relative to the Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index as well as the N.Y. Stock Exchange Airline Index was employed. An estimation window of 45 days was with a five-day event window and a two-day buffer was used. Simple t-tests were used to measure the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns. A discussion is included in the article regarding the appropriateness of these parameters and tests.
Research findings
For the period under study, there were 10,290+ reports about WJ and 716 reports on WJ in conjunction with the word “espionage”. In the 1,278 days under study, there were news reports on WJ on 1,214 days; of those, espionage was mentioned on 193 days. In 16 out of 20 cases of abnormal returns found the researchers were unable to identify any cause other than reports regarding espionage.
WJ’s share prices demonstrated poor performance following the filing of Air Canada’s suit. The stock price also failed to rebound once the suit was settled. Basically, the market responded to the scandal negatively, heavily discounted WJ stock, and waited for when the company could put the case behind them. This started once founder Clive Beddoe began to loosen his control on the company. From the day he stepped down as WJ’s president onward the stock rose, eventually beating the Airline Index price, something it had rarely done since the start of the scandal. In the end, from the time the chair and CEO posts were separated in early September 2007 until the end of 2007 (less than 17 weeks) WJ stock rose over 36% while the TSX remained relatively flat at a 0.6% gain and airline stocks fell over 26%.
WJ’s stock rebound after its board structure change indicates that the change from duality to non-duality was a positive move that allowed the airline to get past the negative press and public backlash. Of the social-control agents, the media played a significant role in the restoring market confidence in the company. The media influenced the public and shareholder perception of how serious WJ’s internet snooping was and then put pressure those with the power to change the board structure to do so. When the duality was reversed, the media eased the pressure by putting a positive spin on the offender’s actions.
Generally, at numerous turns the market response to the spying scandal was to reward profit, punish legal exposure, and feel comfortable about the presses’ editorial absolution after the fact. While there was no significant reaction to the announcement that WJ would end its use of CEO duality, when the actual split of CEO and chair occurred there was a significant positive abnormal return.
Implications for management practice
There are three important implications of the research. First, situational contexts play a vital role in correctly choosing a duality or non-duality structure. Second, board independence is a key for guarding against management entrenchment. Finally, symbolic situational contexts are vital for change.
First, situational contexts in WJ’s case demonstrate how small size, life cycle stage, and duopoly gave Clive Beddoe considerable discretion. Beddoe roles as CEO and Chair allowed for more discretion to respond promptly to the needs of a small, young airline in a fiercely competitive industry. His formal power (as CEO and Chair with a large ownership stake) and informal power (founder stature, tenure, firm- and industry-specific knowledge, and external networks) created a power bundle that explains why duality at WestJet worked well for many years. Fallout from the scandal led to a change to non-duality. This cosmetic retrofit washed off a scandal with possibly serious consequences. Because of the decision’s symbolic nature, the media rationalized the move as real change and so influenced the market perception. This underlies the strong influence of powerful enablers of social construction (media coverage).
Second, board independence is vital for guarding against management wrongdoing. Outside directors should moderate duality’s influence by monitoring management and thwarting any misconduct decision. The high proportion of outsiders on WJ’s board and their apparent lack of involvement in the snooping decisions suggest that they may not have been aware of those decisions. Top executives may have considered snooping a normal operation and thus too trivial to put on the board’s agenda. However, it is the mandate of the board to satisfy itself as to the integrity of senior executives and guidelines for inclusion of agenda items in board meetings should be moulded into its routine and reporting processes.
Third, the role of symbolic situational context in the case is key. WJ emerged from the scandal almost unscathed in terms of material or reputational damage. The ethical/legal lapses and ensuing change of board structure conveyed a different meaning to stockholders, media, and the public and, thus, brought about a positive outcome. With the exception of a small monetary penalty and embarrassment, the CEO voluntarily stepped down, but remained a part of the organization, and business went on as usual.
References
Chowdhury, S. D., & Sheppard, J. P. (2022). Corporate wrongdoing and board leadership structure: An analysis of the WestJet spying scandal. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l’Administration, 39(4), 381-395.Vashisth, A., & Kumar, A. (2013). Corporate espionage: The insider threat. Business Information Review, 30(2), 83-90.
Join the conversation // Rejoindre la conversation
Do you have work you would like to feature in ASAC Dialogue? Contact Kunle Akingbola at oakingbo@lakeheadu.ca.
//
Avez-vous des travaux que vous aimeriez présenter dans ASAC Dialogue ? Contactez Kunle Akingbola à oakingbo@lakeheadu.ca.
You must be logged in to post a comment.